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G L O B A L S U P E R V E N I E N C E A N D B E L I E F 
ABSTRACT. Global supervenience of beliefs about physical states of affairs on such states 
has strongly counter-intuitive consequences about what beliefs we can nomologically hold. 
Tfcs is an argument against a global supervenience of all mental properties on physical 
0 nes, and, since that is implied by strong supervenience, also against that as the preferred 
materialist thesis. 
I. K A P L A N ' S P R O B L E M 
I n (1983) David Kaplan has pointed out a restriction of possible worlds 
^mantics. In the case of doxastic logic it has the consequence that not 
e v e r y possible proposition or state of affairs can be believed. Let W be 
the set of worlds, to which an interpretation of a propositional language 
L of this logic refers. Sentences of the form B(A) of L say that the person, 
whose beliefs are to be described in L - let's call him Max - , believes 
that the proposition expressed by A obtains. If Sw is the set of worlds, 
w hich for Max are in w candidates for the real world, the sentence B(A) 
l s to be true in w iff Sw is a subset of the set [A] of ,4-worlds. In the 
standard version of doxastic logic there are two conditions for the sets 
S » : (a) Sw is a non-empty subset of W, the set of all possible worlds, and 
(h) If w' is in SW9 Sw> is identical with Sw.1 If W contains at least two 
dements, the function S cannot be a mapping of Wonto the power set of 
^ minus the empty set, i.e. onto the set of all possible propositions. 
There are, then, possible propositions, X, for which there is no world w 
such that Sw = X. Not every possible proposition can be believed by 
^ a * , either, since this would mean, that each proposition containing just 
0 n e world could be believed. This would imply Vw3w' {Sw> C {w}), 
f r om which, with (a) and (b), we would obtain Sw> = Sw and therefore 
= {w}). This would have the consequence that B(A) = A would 
^e analytically true; being believed would coincide with being true. If 
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there are n worlds in W, there are 2 n - 1 possible propositions. Each 
should be a possible doxastic attitude of Max, i.e. a possible Sw. For 
n > 1 we have 2n - 1 > n, and for large n the proportion n/2n - 1 of the 
doxastic attitudes that may be realized in the worlds of Wto the possible 
ones becomes exceedingly small. 
This doesn't mean that standard systems of doxastic logic are inade-
quate. For instance B(B(A) D A) is a theorem of such logics - Max 
believes that his beliefs are correct. But it is possible that for some A we 
have B(A) A ->A, i.e. that Max is mistaken. Therefore, i f the operator U 
stands for analytic possibility, i.e. truth in some world of the model, the 
principle 
PI*: M(A) D M(B(A)) - What is possible is possibly 
believed 
cannot be generally true. In particular it does not hold for some sen-
tences A expressing doxastic propositions. It should hold, however, for 
non-doxastic ones - we shall call them "objective" here - , for instance 
those that refer to the external, physical world. For sentences A 
expressing them it should even be logically possible that 
P2*: A D M(B(A) A A) - Each fact can be known. 
2 
Any logic is unacceptable in which this assumption implies omniscience. 
II. O - I N T E R P R E T A T I O N S 
We cannot simply distinguish sentences which express objective propo-
sitions syntactically, as these in which the belief operator B does not 
occur, since sentential constants might have a doxastic meaning, too. A 
semantic distinction is indicated, therefore. As objective propositions are 
to constitute a separate segment of reality, we shall assume that the set 0 
of them is a complete Boolean algebra, i.e. it contains the complement of 
each element and the intersection of each of its subsets. We could define 
an equivalence relation w ~ w' between worlds by stipulating that it 
holds iff the same O-propositions obtain in both worlds. We shall, 
however, proceed the other way round and define O by an equivalence 
relation on W. L is now to contain an operator 0 , "(9 (/I)" standing for 
"It is an objective proposition that A". We also add the operator TV for 
analytic necessity to L . A n appropriate concept of interpretations of L -
W e call them 0-models to distinguish them from standard ones - is this: 
A n O-model of L is a quadruple M = (W, ~, S, V) such that: 
0) W is a non-empty set of worlds. 
(2) ~ is an equivalence relation on W. 
( 3) For all vv € W\ 
(a) 0 ^ sw C IV, 
( b) w' e Sw D sw* = sw. 
(4) For all weW: 
(a) K (^i4) € { * , / } and w ~ w' implies VW{A) = VW>(A) for all sen-
tential constants A and all w' € 
(b) Vw{-iA) and A i?) are defined as usual. 
(c) VW(B{A)) = t iff S„ C [,4], where [i4]:= { w ; : VW*{A) = *}. 
(d) W(i4)) = riffle 
(e) K,(0(i4)) = / iff V w ' w ' V - w" D M ^ ) = M^)))-
A l l atomic sentences, then, are to express objective propositions, and a 
Proposition is objective if it does not distinguish between equivalent 
w orlds. O, the set of objective propositions, is the set {X C IV: Vw w' 
(* ^ w' A w £ X D wf € X)}9 so that we have w ~ w' iff VA r(A r € 0 D 
The ideas behind PI* and P2* can now be expressed by 
PI: 0(A) A M(A) D M(B(A)) - Objective propositions 
can be believed 
P2: 0(A) A AD M(B(A) A A) - Objective facts can be 
known. 
to these versions the postulates do not have the unacceptable consc-
i ences of PI* and P2* anymore. 
The set of sentences true in all 0-models remains the same, if we add to 
° 1 condition: 
(3c) w ~ wf A Sw = Sw> D w = w'. 
L °gica l truth, therefore, is not affected by identifying worlds that are 
objectively equivalent and in which Max holds the same beliefs. 
A sentence of L not containing the operator O is true in all standard 
models iff it is true in all 0-models. If standard models are extended to 
sentences of the form O(A) in such a way that for all sentences C 
N(0(C)) holds, a sentence with O-occurrences is true in all standard 
models if the sentence A! obtained from A by replacing O everywhere by 
00 is true in all 0-models. For in these models N(0(0(C))) is true for 
all C. 
Regarding the connexions between objective and doxastic proposi-
tions we can distinguish two extreme cases of O-models 
M= (W,~,S, V): 
D2: M is maximal iff Vww'(vv ~ w' D Sw = Sw<). M is minimal iff 
VwX(X eOAX^0D 3w'(w' ~ w A Sw< C JIT)). 
For maximal O-models we have w ~ wf D w = wf, using (3c). Therefore 
all propositions are objective, and maximal 0-models coincide with 
standard ones. Minimal O-models, on the other hand, are such that for 
every world w and every possible objective proposition A'there is a world 
w', equivalent to vt>, in which Max believes that X obtains; every such 
proposition can be believed under all possible objective conditions. Let 
[w] be the equivalence class for w, i.e. the set {w'\ w ~ w'}. Then minimal 
O-models are such that Vwvv'Bw" (Sw» C [wf] A w" ~ w). The corre-
sponding postulate in L is 
P3: 0(A)AO(C)AM(A)AM(C) D M(B(A) A C). 
It implies the analytical independence of beliefs about objective propo-
sitions from the objective propositions themselves, and therefore a 
minimal correlation between them. Every consistent set of such beliefs is 
compatible with every consistent set of objective propositions. This is a 
realistic conception of the objective states of affairs, as a domain that is 
independent from our beliefs about it. That we hold certain beliefs about 
the physical world does not logically imply anything about its actual 
condition; our assumptions about it may in principle always turn out to 
be mistaken. This independence may be expressed by 
P3a: 0(A) A M(B(A)) A 0(C) A M(C) D M(B(A) A C ) . 
Since M(B(A)) implies M(A) this is a consequence of P3. P3 is stronger 
than P3a in so far as M(A) A 0(A) does not imply M(B(A)). 
There are O-models in which P3 holds. Let W0 be some non-empty set 
of worlds, Wx the set of non-empty subsets of W0, and W = W0 x Wu i.e. 
the set of pairs (w, Z ) . w, w ' , . . . are to be elements of W0, Z,Z',... 
those of Wu and v, v',... elements of W. Let S{w,z) be Z x { Z } , and 
(w, Z ) ~ z') iff u> = w'. Then the sets S„ satisfy the conditions from 
D l> 3. We have Xe O = 3 Z ( Z CW0AX=ZxWi), and W 3 v " (v" 
^vASv* c [i/]). For if v = ( w , Z ) and v' = (w', Z ' ) , we may set?;" = 
(»> {*'}). Then v / ; - v and 5V« = {w'Wiw'}} C [vf] = {wf} x Wu 
III . G L O B A L S U P E R V E N I E N C E 
In discussions of global supervenience (GS, for short) it is mostly 
assumed that physical propositions form a complete Boolean algebra.3 If 
w e define our equivalence relation w ~ w' in such a way that it holds iff 
the same physical propositions obtain in w and w', O is the set of these 
Propositions. If X, again, is a subset of W, {w: Sw C X} is the doxastic 
Proposition, that Max believes X to obtain. In w and w' the same dox-
astic propositions hold if Sw = Sw>. A n analytic GS of doxastic states of 
affairs on physical ones would mean: If two worlds differ as to the truth 
°f some doxastic propositions, they also differ as to the truth of some 
Physical propositions. This can be expressed by 
( 0 \/ww'(w ~ w' D Sw = SW') 
ff that holds, we have a maximal 0-model, each proposition is objective, 
and postulates P I and P2 coincide with P I * and P2*. But then we are 
faced again with the difficulties from which we started in Section I. 
According to (1) each physical proposition can be known only if for all 
^ntence A we have B(A) = A, for instance. In each world in which Max 
i s not omniscient, there are then physical facts that he cannot know for 
analytical reasons, and not just a few, but the overwhelming mass of 
lhem, as we have seen. According to (1), furthermore, every doxastic 
Proposition is identical with a physical one, 4 so that there can be no 
^dependence of physical facts from doxastic ones. (1), therefore, is not 
compatible with a realistic conception of physical reality. 
Those are all strongly counter-intuitive consequences of an analytical 
G s in the form of (1). Generally, however, GS is not defined as an 
a n alyt ical , but as a nomological relation. Let r be a relation of 
accessibility such that wrw' iff the same laws of nature hold in w and w'. 
r, then, is an equivalence relation. Let rw = {wf: wrw'} be the set of the 
worlds in which the same natural laws hold as in w, and let WQ be the real 
world. For rWo we also write ro. No is to be an operator for nomologic 
necessity with the truth condition: Vw(No(A)) = / iff rw C [A], Mo is to 
express the corresponding nomological possibility. 
A nomological G S of doxastic on physical states of affairs holds, if we 
have 
(2) Vww'(w, w' € r0 A w ~ w' D Sw = Sw>). 
Materialists not only assume a G S of doxastic, but of all states of affairs 
on physical ones. For them, then, natural laws are also physical propo-
sitions. Since O is a complete Boolean algebra, this also holds for the 
conjunction of all natural laws, holding in a world. Then rw is in O, and 
we obtain 
(3) Www'w"(w ~ w'D (w e rw» = w' e rw»)). 
Because of the symmetry of r this is equivalent with 
(3a) Vww'(w ~ wr D rw = rw>) - In equivalent worlds the same 
laws of nature hold. 
Now, weakening (1) to (2) does not prevent Gs from having counter-
intuitive consequences. First, assume 0(A) and let Af express the pro-
position {w: w € ro A Sw C [A]}. Then we have (i) O(A'), (ii) N0(B(A) ss 
A') and (iii) N(B(A') D B(A)). (i) follows from (2) and (3). In the case of 
(iii), i f we have Sw C [A'], there is a world w' such that w' e Sw and 
therefore Swf CI X\ since Sw — Sw> we then also have Sw C X. Because of 
0(A) and (i) we also have 0(Af A ->A), and from that we obtain 
M(A' A D M(B(A' A ^ A)) by P2. From M(A' A -v4), therefore, we 
would obtain M(B(A') A B{pA)) and with (iii) M(B(A) A B(-^A)). 
Hence M(A' A ^ A) cannot be true, i.e. we have N(A' D A) and in view 
of (ii) No(B(A) D A). From the assumption that Max can believe every 
possible objective proposition, we thus get the absurd conclusion by (2) 
that his beliefs are nomologically true. 
Furthermore, although the realistic independence postulate P3a does 
not exclude nomological correlations between doxastic and physical 
states of affairs, together with (2) it leads to quite implausible 
assumptions about analytical restrictions as to what can be believed. 
First, any physical proposition which may analytically be believed is 
Relieved with nomological necessity. That is 
(4) 0(A) A M(B(A)) D N0(B(A)). 
Semantically P3a corresponds to the assumption VXY(X G O A 3 w(Sw 
^ ) A y E O A r / 0 D 3w'(Sw> C X A w' G Y)). This implies V A V ' 
(* € O A 3w(Sw CX)A w" G r 0 D 3w'(w' € ro A Sw> C XAw' ~ w"))9 
since w" G r 0 and w' ~ w" imply w' € r 0 according to (3). But from w', 
€ ro a n d w" ~ w' we obtain S > = Sw> by (2). Therefore we have VX 
(X € O A 3 WOSH, C J ) D Vw / ; (w ; / G r 0 3 S > C A r ) ) , and that is the 
semantic correlate to (4). 
Secondly, what is believed about the physical world in two analytically 
Possible worlds would always have to be compatible, i.e. 
(5) 0(A) A 0(C) A M(B(A)) A M(B(C)) D M(A AC). 
From the antecedent of (5) we obtain N0(B(A A C)) by (4), and, with 
M(*(A)) D M(A) for all A, M(A AC). Finally, since 0(A) implies 
(6) 0(A) A M(B(A)) D ^M(B(^A)) 
is a consequence of (5): For no physical proposition it is both analytically 
Possible to believe it to be true and analytically possible to believe it to be 
f alse. This is not only implausible, but absurd. But then G S in the sense 
°f (2) is incompatible with a realistic conception of physical reality in the 
sense of P3a. 
In our discussion we have used a rather narrow concept of belief. 
We have only considered a propositional language and only beliefs of 
one person; we have just referred to beliefs at a certain moment and 
have employed a strictly rational concept of belief, not fitted for the 
description of factual systems of assumptions, since they are not closed 
w i t h respect to logical consequences. A generalization for languages of 
Predicate logic and the beliefs of several persons, however, would not 
m a k e any essential difference. More important would be an account of 
doxastic and physical changes in the different worlds, because we could 
toen formulate intuitive assumptions about what we may come to believe 
m ore adequately, but we should still arrive at the same consequences. 
We still have no satisfactory descriptive concept of belief, but if beliefs 
do not refer to propositions as sets of worlds, but rather to entities 
composed of objects and their attributes, the number of possible states 
of belief surpasses that of possible worlds even farther, so that our 
argument would only be strengthened. 
N O T E S 
1 For doxastic logic, cf. for instance Lenzen (1980). 
2 Knowledge, normally, is not defined as true conviction, but as true and well-founded 
conviction. This, however, is not an important point in our context. Well-founded beliefs 
are not truer than true beliefs, and they have no higher subjective probability either. They, 
too, can be wrong. Well-founded beliefs are best conceived of as beliefs that have been 
formed according to intersubjective standards of rationality, cf. Legris (1990). 
3 The notion of GS for properties has been introduced by Hellman and Thompson in 
(1975), for propositions by Haugeland in (1982). Cf. also Kim (1984) and Kutschera (1992). 
4 Let Y = {w: Sw C Z} be a doxastic proposition. For X = U{[u>]: we Y }, we have 
X e O and X = Y: w e Yimplies [w] C X, i.e. w e X, and for w e A" we have [w] C X, hence 
there is a w' e Ksuch that w' ~ w. By (1) we obtain Sw = Sw*9 and therefore w 6 Y. Cf. 
Bacon (1986). 
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